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A PERSPECTIVE ON "NAZIS IN THE COURTROOM"
NORMAN L. GREENE1

"Nazis in the Courtroom" draws on the Nazi experience to
consider the problem of judges and lawyers who are complicit
with evil law. These are judges or lawyers who knew or should
have known better and therefore faced a moral choice: what
should they have done when faced with laws that are evil in
their letter or in their application?2 As one of the panelists,
David Luban, notes, the concern is not with the Nazi
"monsters," but with the "good" judges.' The participants in
the program explore the issues raised by the conflict between
adherence to the form of law and adherence to substantive
morality.

The relationship between law and morality has been the
subject of ongoing debate.4 The debate presupposes that a
judge may find himself caught between the law and his own
conscience. Should the judge park his conscience at the
courthouse door in applying law?5 Does a judge, applying the
' Copyright 1996 Norman L. Greene. All Rights Reserved. Mr. Greene is a
partner in the New York City law firm of Schoeman, Marsh & Updike, LLP and
Chair of the Committee on Lectures and Continuing Education of The Association
of the Bar of the City of New York.
2 Although this program is limited to lawyers and judges, other professions,
including physicians, also bore a measure of responsibility for the tragic success of
the Nazi program. See, Edward Ernst, A Leading Medical School Seriously
Damaged. Vienna 1938, 122 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 789, 792 (May 15,
1995) ("The historic role played by the [medical] profession in the Third Reich,
however is indisputable: Had the profession taken a strong stand . . . it is
conceivable that the entire idea . . . of genocide would not have taken place.")
(internal quotations ommitted).
' See also Markus D. Dubber, Judicial Positivism and Hitler's Injustice, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1807 (1993) (reviewing INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE
COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (1991)). "Let us focus not on the Nazi 'monsters,' but
on the 'good' judges, the best judges Germany had to offer at the time. . . ." Id.
at 1824 (footnotes omitted). Dubber suggests that of these judges the following
questions might have been asked:
How could these judges year after year interpret laws that to us seem so
patently inhumane and unjust? How could those law professors who
were not fanatic Nazis continue to teach and develop inhumane and
unjust legal doctrines that fueled the legal murder machine of Nazi
Germany?
Id. at 1825.
" See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARv. L. REv. 593 (1958) and Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A
Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
r See, e.g., Norman L. Greene, No Duty for Lawyers to Ignore Conscience,
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law as written, discharge his responsibilities?' H.L.A. Hart
asked, "Is law open to moral criticism? Or does the admission
that a rule is a valid legal rule preclude moral criticism or
condemnation of it by reference to moral standards or
principles?" '
The Nazi experience was a situation involving laws so
monstrous, and the Nazi legal system was so flawed, that one
might contend that it is not relevant to the American
experience.' But the problem of enforcing unjust laws is not
an alien experience to American judges. The crisis between
judicial conscience and the law has had, and continues to have,
grave implications for American judges faced with enforcing
laws they believe to be unjust. The dilemma of the anti-slavery
judge faced with the question of whether to enforce the fugitive
slave laws presents the most poignant example.9 Robert Cover
argues that these judges were complicit with a system of law
they thought immoral.1 °
As Judge Weinstein notes, the law versus conscience issue
also arises in the context of the application of mandatory
N.Y.L.J., September 25, 1995, at 2 (letter to the editor) ('[L]awyers and judges
cannot simply lay aside their conscience when they do their work. They cannot
ignore the implications of what they are doing on the basis that one law is like
another, merely because it appears in a statute book.").
' Judge Weinstein has answered this question in the negative: 'Me Nazi
judges' silence, acquiescence, and active participation in the gravest injustices
serves as a reminder that the duty to decide cases in accordance with statutes or
precedent is not absolute." Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges' Learning,
Speaking, and Acting: Part U Speaking and Part IZ Acting, 20 U. DAYtON L.
REV. 1, 25 (1994) (footnote omitted).
7H

-. HART, LAW LIBERTY AND MORALTY 3 (1963).

Cf. Dubber, supra note

3, at 1825-26 ("Legal positivism's strict and proud division between law and
morality, its hostility to even the suggestion of assessing the extralegal validity of
positive law, permitted lawyers to rationalize to theraelves and others their
interpretation and application of laws they might, upon reflection, have considered
to be grotesquely unjust or immoral!).
8 E.g., Fuller, supra note 4, at 660 ('To me there is nothing shockdng in
saying that a dictatorship which clothes itself with a tinsel of legal form can so
far depart from the morality of order, from the inner morality of law itself, that it
ceases to be a legal system).
9 ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISIAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

(1975); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 538-47
(1974). As Judge Weinstein has observed, similar issues were faced where a few
segregationist judges resisted the United States Supreme Court'a attempts at
integration. Weinstein, supra note 6, at 28.
10

COVER, supra note 9, at 6.
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federal sentencing guidelines (which he specifically refers to as
"immoral sentencing laws") in criminal cases by judges opposed
to them. A recent controversy in New York illustrates this
dilemma as well. A conflict arose between a District Attorney
who had expressed reservations about capital punishment and
the Governor who supports capital punishment. The issue was
whether the prosecutor would seek the death penalty in a
particular murder case involving the murder of a police officer.
These modern examples, among others, underscore the
continuing relevance of the debate."
The gap between law and morality arises not only when
the laws themselves are evil but when laws are the subject of
overly rigid interpretation, leading to unjust results. As
Richard Weisberg notes, this gap has been treated in literature
as well as law. In Billy Budd, Herman Melville's Captain Vere
stands on one side of the dilemma as he argues the imperative
of following the law regardless of consequences: "For [ I law
and the rigor of it, we are not responsible. Our vowed
responsibility is in this: That however pitilessly that law may
operate, we nevertheless adhere to it and administer it ...
,,I2 In his study of the dilemma faced by antebellum judges,
Cover writes that his study of judges concerns those, who
thinking slavery immoral, "confronted Vere's dilemma, the
choice between the demands of role and the voice of conscience.
And it was he [i.e., the anti-slavery judge who enforced fugitive
slave laws] who contributed so much to the force of legitimacy

" See, e.g., Rachel L. Swarns, Governor Removes Bronx Prosecutorfrom Murder
Case, N.Y. TIMES, March 22, 1996, at A6. See also, Letter from Robert T. Johnson,

Bronx County District Attorney, to George E. Pataki, Governor of New York
(published in New York Daily News, March 21, 1996, at 4) (letter submitted in
response to Governor's question regarding whether the District Attorney had a
policy against the death penalty). The letter highlights the District Attorney's
concerns about the death penalty, despite the Governor's threat to remove him
from the case if he had such a policy. Inferring that the District Attorney had

refused to confirm that he would seek the death penalty, the Governor superseded
the District Attorney's authority and replaced him on the case.
12 HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD 68-69 (Signet Classics 1961) (1891). In his
analysis of BILLY BUDD, Cover suggests that "In Vere's words we have a

positivist's condensation of a legal system's formal character." COVER, supra note
9, at 2. Under this conception of law "the judge is not responsible for the content
of the law but for its straightforward application." Id. at 3.
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that law
may provide, for he plainly acted out of impersonal
13
duty."

Another example appears in Alan Paton's Cry, The Beloved
Country, where a South African judge absolves himself of the
obligation to do anything other than administer the law,

regardless of its justice, in sentencing Absalom Kumalo to
death

for murder.14

Likewise,

English judges

in

the

nineteenth century handed out death sentences for a wide
variety of crimes, despite discomfort with the harshness of the
law. The severity of the criminal code, which the judges well
recognized, sometimes provoked them to tears.15
Given the enormity of their misconduct, Nazi judges could

have benefitted from an infusion of conscience, no matter how
great. As for American judges, however, undue reliance on

conscience may raise different problems. Mary Ann Glendon,
who does not focus on the Nazi judicial system, refers to the

American judges in the early part of the twentieth century who
exhibited compassion toward big business at the expense of
overworked women and children.16 Glendon notes that "[tihe
COVER, supra note 9, at 6.
"See

ALAN PATON, CRY, THE BELOVED COUNTRY 199-200 (Charles Scribners

Sons 1976) (1948), where the judge noted the following:.
[Slociety . . . has made law, and has set judges to administer it, and has
freed those judges from any obligation whatsoever but to administer the law.
... If the law is the law of a society that some feel to be unjust, it is the
law and the society that must be changed. In the meantime there is an
existing law that must be administered, and it is the sacred duty of a Judge
to administer it.

15 ROBERT HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE 30 (Vintage Books 1938) (1986) ('The
judge simply surrendered to the imperative of the statutes, a course of action that
absolved him of judicial murder, and that caused him to weep...

").

6 ItARY A. GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 163 (1994). Glendon
notes:
But are judicial compassion and responsiveness viable substitutes for the
elusive ideal of impartiality? Few would dispute that judges should be able
to empathize with the men and women who come before them. But in the
early years of this century, adventurous judges were extremely tenderhearted
toward big business, while showing little compassion for women and children
working long hours in factories.
Id. Some examples include Adkins v. Children's Hospital of District of Columbia,
261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down minimum wage for female workers); Hammer

v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (ban on commerce in products of child labor
unconstitutional); and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (maximum 60
work week for bakery employees struck down as a violation of freedom of
contract). See also RLo? HOcHHUTH, THE DEPUTY 83 (Grove Press, Inc. 1964)
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problem with subjective judging is that sooner or later, the
tables are apt to be turned when ambitious judges with the
'wrong' ideas ascend to the bench." 7
"Nazis in the Courtroom" begins with Professor Fritz Stern
sketching the historical context of the administration of justice
in twentieth century Germany. As David Luban notes, and
Stern concurs, during the Weimar Republic, judges "brutally
persecuted leftists and blatantly protected the violent right,
including Hitler."
David Luban defines his topic as a "report on the legality
of evil" and questions to what extent the rule of law can
immunize and safeguard jurists from evil-doing. He explains
the willingness or eagerness of Nazi judges to "advance the
Nazi program by enforcing monstrous law." He catalogues a
number of examples of judicial misconduct in the enforcement
of Nazi laws, including jailing a Jewish man for looking across
the street at a German woman; killing a Jewish man for
having an affair with a German woman; and executing another
Jewish man for possibly having such an affair. Nazi judges
refused even to consider evidence that the Nazis had set the
Reichstag fire during the Reichstag fire trial.
Did the Nazi judges fail because of their adherence to
positivism-their belief that law and morality are separate?
Was there an excessive devotion by German judges to the rule
of law? 8 Was it because they treated the laws the way that a
(1963) ("Conscience? Who could trust thati Conscience or God: men never have
wreaked such havoc as when invoking God--or an idea. Conscience is a

treacherous guide. I am convinced that Hitler acts according to his conscience. No,
I need an answer from outside myself.")
11 GLENDON, supra note 16, at 165. Once again, the bankruptcy of the Nazi

legal system makes comparisons difficult. It is hard to imagine condemning Nazi
judges charged with enforcing racially and religiously discriminatory law from
engaging in too much subjectivity in order to avoid its harsh effects.
Furthermore, the panelists noted that the consequences of Nazi judges having
resisted are debatable. Judge Weinstein commented that German judicial
resistance might have prevented the Holocaust. David Luban suggested that had
the Nazi judges refused to enforce the law and resigned, they would have been
replaced by more willing Nazi judges. In the Vichy context, Richard Weisberg
argued that Vichy lawyers had the skill and capacity to void the discriminatory
French laws.
18 See, Fuller, supra note 4, at 659. Fuller notes:

German legal positivism not only banned from legal science any
consideration of the moral ends of law, but it was also indifferent to
what I have called the inner morality of law itself. The German lawyer
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soldier treats an order, with the judge saying that a law is a
law, like a soldier stating that an order is an order? Or did
they fail because Nazi law directed judges not to interpret laws
positivistically?'9
Professor Luban points to a number of factors responsible
for their behavior and concludes that the rule of law bore a
degree of responsibility in immunizing Nazi judges from their
conscience. The judges were obedient to the law at the expense
of morality or even basic human decency. He adds that certain
legal reasoning of the Nazi judges was all too recognizable by
professional standards; and without arguing for the moral
equivalence of American and Nazi judges, he even finds
parallels in the decisions of American courts.
Richard Weisberg notes that despite having the capacity
and skill to protest, judges in Vichy, France matched the Nazis
in their willingness to enforce racial laws and, at times,
exceeded it or developed their own form of anti-semitic laws."0
It was their behavior, more than German pressure, that led to
the implementation of anti-Jewish laws in Vichy. Among other
things, Vichy lawyers would advise clients on whether they
were Jewish under the definitions of racial laws; there were
treatise and manual writers on the subject; and racial law
became big business.
Professor Weisberg concludes that the story of Vichy
lawyers is especially troublesome in light of the similar
principles underlying American and French legal traditions,
including equality under the law and due process. He notes
that the Vichy experience, in which some defenders of
individual rights brought up under noble legal lessons became
co-opted into enforcing Vichy's racial laws, is a cautionary tale
for Americans.

was therefore peculiarly prepared to accept as "law" anything that called
itself by that name, was printed at government expense, and seemed to
come "von oben herab" [from on high].
For example, Professor Luban cites a Nazi code which permitted punishment
for an act "which deserves to be punished according to the spirit of a rule of
criminal law and healthy folk-feeling" (a synonym for "Whatever the Nazi party
wanted).
21 Richard Weisberg, Legal Rhetoric Under Stress: The Example of Vichy, 12
CARDoZo L. REV. 1371, 1415 (1991) (The 'willingness

of (the Vichy French] to

draft laws in a manner often exceeding the German conqueror's demands set
precedents even the Nuremberg laws and Nazi courts had not imagined .. . ").
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Judge Weinstein discusses what judges can do when faced
with immoral laws, noting that judges "can ignore neither
monstrous nor routine injustices." According to Judge
Weinstein, "[olf the various options available to American
judges when faced with an immoral law, only one is ruled out:
silent acquiescence."' Although resignation is a principled
option for some judges in certain cases, this might also result
in the replacement of good judges with government puppets.22
Other judicial techniques include distinguishing unjust
precedent and deliberately risking reversal in order to ensure
that the appellate courts and the public recognize the strong
opposing moral views.23
Judge Weinstein wonders what would have happened if all
judges refused to enforce a particular law. His view is that in
the conflict between law and morality, morality would prevail.
Indeed, he suggests that if substantially all German judges
had resisted the Nazi laws, the Holocaust might have been
brought to a halt. Based upon his experience with other judges
in his court (the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York), he predicts that the judges in the
United States would stand up for morality and withstand
assaults by injustice. He concludes that when "they
individually think it necessary, judges have the responsibility
to speak up and ask for justice."
Although not focusing exclusively on the Nazi era,
Professor Teitel considers the effect totalitarian precedents
should have been afforded in post-war German courts, in
Id.
' Cf Dubber, supra note 3, at 1815 (one victim of Nazi persecution
acknowledged that some Nazi judges "remained in office to soften the impact of
unjust Nazi laws").
23 The approaches Judge Weinstein would use differ from those of Cover.
Weinstein cites Cover as suggesting that
In a static and simplistic model of law, the judge caught between law
and morality has only four choices. [1] He may apply the law against his
conscience. [21 He may apply conscience and be faithless to the law. [3]
He may resign. [41 Or he may cheat: He may state that the law is not
what he believes it to be and, thus preserve an appearance (to others) of
conformity of law and morality.
Weinstein, supra note 6, at 27 (quoting COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED at 6 (emphasis
added)). Weinstein argues that Cover's "second and fourth options ignore the great
flexibility of the American common law and its historical forms of interpretation."
Id.
21
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developing her theme that there is more than one law and may
be a split between formal law and justice. How did these
judges handle the conflict between evil laws and their judicial
role?
In particular, Professor Teitel focuses on post-Communist
German courts, discussing the prosecution of border guards in
post-Communist courts for shootings of people crossing the
border during the Communist era in the former East Germany.
The guards' defense was that they were just following the law
prohibiting unlawful border crossings.
In one case, the court was required to decide whether the
post-Communist judges would apply the previous (Communist)
law and accept the defense that the guards were following the
unjust law. Professor Teitel points out that despite the written
law, there are circumstances in which defendants (such as the
border guards) should have known that the border-crossing
law--even though it was settled law-should not have been
considered "law" in its true sense.' She concludes by noting
that there are signs in the United States of a gap between law
as written and the people's understanding of law-the "public
perception of law as lawful and the law as written"-and these
are troubling.
The Committee on Lectures and Continuing Education, in
conjunction with the Committees on Civil Rights and
International Human Rights, is pleased to present this
important symposium and to have the opportunity to bring
these issues to the attention of the bench and bar. We are
grateful to our distinguished panelists and, in particular, our
moderator, Ambassador Herbert S. Okun, for lending their
talents and experience to this subject.

' See generally, Ruti G. Teitel, Paradoxes in the Revolution of the Rule of Law,
19 YALE J. INT'L L. 239, 240 (1994). Professor Teitel noted that in the border
guards' case, the German court rejected the border guards' defenses although they
depended on prior law, relying on past decisions concerning the Nazi regime.
According to Professor Teitel, the court relied on
a doctrine established in a 1953 decision distinguishing positive law from
justice, stating 'The experience of the National Socialist regime in Germany,
in particular, has taught that . . . it must be possible in extreme cases to
value the principle of material justice more highly than the principle of the
certainty of the law."
Id. at 243-44 (footnote omitted).
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PROFESSOR FRITZ STERN25

Ladies and Gentleman, I trust you will believe me that
when I got this invitation to talk before this particular
audience I found it intimidating. I was reminded of the line
from my favorite modem play, A Man for All Seasons, where
Sir Thomas More is made to say, "The currents and eddies of
rights, of right and wrong, which you will find such plain
sailing, I can't navigate. But in the thickets of the law, oh
there I am a forester."2 6 In those very thickets, alas, I am a
foreigner, far from being a forester, and therefore I appear
here with a certain degree of trepidation. All I can do is
suggest something of the historic context of the administration
of justice and injustice in twentieth-century Germany, a
country that at the beginning of this century prided itself on
the high standards and the incorruptibility of what was called
the Rechtsstaat2
We must remember that in the first half of the nineteenth
century, in the German states, the legal profession was on the
liberal side. Above all, it demanded a written constitution that
embodied liberal designs. The legal profession's importance can
be measured by, for example, its presence at the Frankfurt
Assembly in 1848. Subsequent history shows that liberal
commitment diminished as the political culture of Germany
changed. In the late 1870s, the practice of law became free, so
that access to the practice of law was no longer entirely up to
the state, yet at the same time a new conservative push from
the government occurred in regard to judicial appointments.
From the 1890s to 1918 (under the old imperial regime),
German lawyers tended to be part of the establishment and, on
the whole, a very conservative group. They were part of the
upper class group, by status and by prestige. Most of them had
a sense of calling, of entitlement, and were proud of their
cultivation and their civic responsibility. Still, German
lawyers-particularly judges-were historically picked for their
political loyalty or correctness and were part of the
University Professor, Columbia University.
ROB3ERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS, 37 (1960)
' The Rechtsstaat may be thought of as "the state in which the rule of law
bounds the exercise of political power." David Dyzenhaus, The Legitimacy of
Legality, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 129, 137 (1996).
'

2
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monarchical establishment.
Let me make just one brief, but important, parenthetical
remark on a subject to which we will have to return, and that
is the question of Jews. Once the legal profession became a socalled free profession, Jews played a disproportionate role as
attorneys, just as they did in the medical profession. Indeed,
Jews occupied disproportionate positions throughout the upper
echelons of German society, so much so that in 1905 half of the
bar in Berlin consisted of Jews. Yet the opposite was true of
the bench: Jews, until 1918, found it extremely difficult to
become judges.
It would be impossible to overestimate the impact of the
First World War, of defeat, and of the revolution, on
Germany's society and on the German judiciary. It led to a
general radicalization both to the left and to the right. Simply
put, judges (and to a lesser extent lawyers), after the so-called
revolution in November 1918, felt disinherited and resentful,
even though the revolution had not touched them and they had
retained their positions.
They felt disinherited because they believed that it was no
longer their society, their country, their world. The Social
Democrats established the Weimar Republic in November
1918, and then a democratic coalition wrote the constitution in
the spring of 1919. The new constitution left the judges in the
offices they occupied under the old constitution. Only later did
the Social Democrats discover that the Weimar judiciary was
in very large measure anti-republican. The judiciary was
contemptuous of the very political system in which they were
to administer justice. In the first three years of the Weimar
Republic (roughly 1918-19 to 1923), infamous political murders
and crimes occurred. There were also street crimes of a
political nature. It became common for German judges to
administer "political justice." Political justice meant that those
who had committed murder but came from the right and
claimed to be nationalists were often commended for their
selflessness and idealism, while those on the left received
much harsher treatment. To cite the words of Gustav
Radbruch, the minister of justice (a Social Democrat at the
time and a judicial scholar), there was a state of war between
the people and the judiciary during the Weimar period.
Hitler's trial in November 1923 (after he had tried to
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overthrow the Reich government) was a mockery of justice. His
sentencing was also a mockery of justice, illustrated by the fact
that he was not deported as an alien as the law required.
Needless to say, if Hitler had been deported back to Austria in
1923, history would have been very different, and some of us
might not be here tonight. After Hitler's violent putsch against
the regime failed, he then undertook a so-called March of
Legality. This march demonstrates one of the important things
to remember about the Third Reich and its context:
Throughout-and especially in the first two years after they
came to power-the Nazis tried to maintain facades of
normalcy and legality, facades that allowed judges and
attorneys to make their compromises and become complicitous.
There were a couple of stages by which this was done.
First, the Weimar Constitution was used perversely to subvert
its own principles. The Reichstag fire in February 1933, a
month after Hitler came to power, gave the Nazis the
opportunity to create, by so-called constitutional means,
emergency decrees that the octogenarian president signed, as
he had to. For all practical purposes, these decrees abrogated
all civil rights, never to be restored.
The Enabling Act of March 1933 gave the existing cabinet
four years of decree power, an act consistent with the
constitution. Also in March 1933, the first concentration camps
were established. Next, in April 1933, the infamous decree on
the "restoration" of the professional civil service removed
political opponents (so-called non-aryans and others) from most
civil-service positions. This decree obviously targeted judges;
some lawyers were also disbarred. That the judges and other
civil servants accepted this first violation of the principle of the
constitution and allowed the exclusion of their Jewish
colleagues without a collective protest or significant individual
protest was a tremendous encouragement to the regime, which
in the beginning was still uncertain of how far it could go.
During the weeks when the Nazi regime was establishing
itself, there was a nearly total absence of protest against the
revocation of what would be considered basic civil rights.
Gradually there came into being-and this is why I mentioned
the concentration camps-a kind of dual-state existence. There
was a normalcy in judicial proceedings concerning what one
might call normal criminal cases. Then there were the cases of
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political justice and so-called political crimes, of which more
and more were given into the hands of special courts over
which the Gestapo and the SS had control. In this dual system,
the most normal achievements of civilized life such as habeas
corpus quickly became unknown. Once, of course, you were in
the concentration camp or in prison for political reasons (or
later for racial reasons), there was no recourse at all.
This is a fairly important point about the Nazi regime in
general. Remember what I said about the judges and their
behavior in the Weimar republic in a free democratic society,
when they allowed the Nazis to throw their political
opponents, among whom were communists and socialists and
so-called aryans by the thousands, into concentration camps. If
Germans, German lawyers and judges among them, had been
willing to do this to each other-to other Germans-we should
understand how this kind of violence and brutality led to the
atrocities and horrors that came much later when Germans did
it to non-Germans. Thank you.
PROFESSOR RICHARD

H. WEISBERGe

The last few times that I had the honor of addressing an
audience in this room concerned two literary texts, one Billy
Budd and the other The Merchant of Venice, and I think that
some of you may have been to one or the other of those

I Richard Weisberg holds a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from Cornell

University (with his M.A. in French supervised by Paul de Man) and his JM.
from the Columbia University School of Law, where he was an editor of the Law
Review. He currently holds the Walter Floersheimer Chair in Constitutional Law
at the Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School of Yeshiva University. Professor Weisberg

has been on the graduate faculty in French and Comparative Literature at the
University of Chicago, and more recently has been a visiting prefessor of English
at Brandeis University. He has visited as well at a half-dozen law faculties in the
United States and in Australia, Israel and Canada.
The author of three pioneering books in the field of Law and Literature,

Professor Weisberg will soon publish VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST INFRANCE
(Gordon & Breach Worldwide; the NYU Press for North America). He has recently
been awarded a Rockefeller grant for a residence in Belagio, where he and
Professor Geoffrey Hartman will develop their project, Towards a Post.Modernist

Sense of Text and Culture.
Professor Weisberg is general editor of CARDOZO STUDIES IN LAW AND
LrrERATURE, now in its seventh year of publication.
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occasions. These are also texts that I think are important to
keep in mind as we tie together some of the themes of tonight's
discussions. Billy Budd is a text that tests the distinction
between natural law and positive law, which most of us will be
touching on, and I think David Luban in particular. The
struggle between what lawyers think of as their professional
duty and their personal conscience is a very subtle process,
particularly in Vichy, but a very important aspect of the debate
about the way Nazi judges acted under the Third Reich too.
The Merchant of Venice, I think, is a text that teaches us how
what might be called polite anti-semitism becomes caught up
and made a part of legal discourse. People who would not
otherwise previously speak in those kinds of ways become
involved in a process that co-opts them until they find
themselves speaking as lawyers or judges in ways that prior to
the occasion in question they would have considered abhorrent.
This for me is the particular interest of Vichy, France: a
system that was in many respects very similar to our own,
precisely as regards the stories that most lawyers who
practiced during 1940-44 in France were educated into. These
stories were very similar to the constitutional stories that we
learn in this country. Stories based on the same great
principles of the 1790s: the rights of people, the rights of all
mankind, egalitarianism under the law, due process, all this
was part of the education and the practice of French lawyers
prior to 1940. The conundrum is, how could they have behaved
the way they did? At least as regards Jews, how could they
come to violate the noble legal lessons that had been ingrained
into them? The ancillary question for us as an American
audience is perhaps more provocative in the case of Vichy than
in the case of the Third Reich precisely because of the similar
traditions Vichy shares with us. Can it happen here? Has it
indeed happened here? Is it happening now in our own
system? Vichy law forces us to personalize the issue, to take it
beyond good and evil to a real question for us as American
lawyers.
The behavior of French lawyers, judges, and bureaucratsfar more than German force or pressure-brought about the
anti-Jewish laws and their implementation in Vichy, France.
Furthermore, the extent of the damage to Jews on French soil
was a function less of traditionally virulent anti-semitism or of
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political pandering to fascist influence than of the desire by the
professional legal community to take the new doctrinal area of
racial laws to its logical conclusion without challenging the
laws on any high level of legal-let alone moral- generalization. The French legal community's way of reading the
racial laws, in effect, created those laws as they actually came
to persecute Jews on French soil. Italian lawyers faced with a
similar statutory scheme under Hitler's ally Mussolini largely
ignored those laws. They were not implemented until the
Germans rolled into their country. In Belgium, a week after
the promulgation of laws against Jews (not by an indigenous
regime, as happened in France, but by the Nazi authorities in
Belgium), prominent lawyers and judges immediately wrote a
letter to the German occupying authorities protesting this antisemitic legislation and claiming that it was no part of Belgian
tradition to ostracize Jewish lawyers and judges and that
indeed it was against the law of war for an occupying authority
to take a step of that kind. In Denmark, the general
population stood up and said no; 7300 of some 7700 Danish
Jews were saved. In France, there was virtually no protest by
lawyers against these racial laws that their own countrymen
had promulgated and that ran so against French legal
tradition. Thus, often on a case-by-case basis, some 75,000
Jews on French soil were sent to their slaughter in the camps
in the East; some 3000 Jews never made it that far, for they
died in the French-run Vichy camps in the southern zone.
At every point, Vichy lawyers had the capacity and the
skill to protest and even potentially render null and void the
black ink of the statutes. Indeed, there was sporadic public
protest against many legal changes brought under Vichy, yet
no lawyer directly attacking the new regime and its laws
suffered any sanction that we know of. There was even one
such jugular attack on the Jewish laws themselves published
by a law professor as early as November 1940, one month after
the first Vichy racial statute was promulgated. (As Professor
Stern has pointed out about Germany, so in Vichy there was
an amazing swiftness and rapidity with which the regime
promulgated these racial statutes.) This protest made by a law
professor was published prominently in occupied France under
the eyes both of the Nazis and the Vichy bureaucrats,
demonstrating that it was possible to protest. Unfortunately,
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no one else prominent in the legal community joined the
bandwagon of that protest. The story of what happened to that
particular professor is this: he suffered no penalties for
protesting; rather his career advanced, he was promoted, and
by the end of the Vichy period his own discourse had
accommodated the racial statutes, and he was dealing with
them not on the level of high protest of his original publication
but on relatively low levels of generalization. In other words,
he retreated to the hairsplitting lawyer-like questions that all
of us in the profession love to deal with but that perhaps only
avoid the most significant legal issues raised by laws of this
kind.
Vichy lawyers' manner of reading Vichy's many antiJewish laws and regulations (there were over 200 of them
published by the French) wound up extending the scope of the
legislation to more groups and individuals than the German
precedents demanded or sometimes even suggested. On crucial
matters of racial identification particularly there were
hundreds of cases involving individuals in the gray area of
mixed grandparental heritage. Does a person with two Jewish
and two non-Jewish grandparents count as a Jew? Ironically,
the Nazis felt that Vichy was probing too deeply, too
legalistically, into this question. To give just one example, in
Nazi Germany in similar cases the production of a baptismal
record by a lawyer on behalf of such a mixed-heritage person
was dispositive of the issue of that person's aryan status. In
France, because of its long tradition of anti-clericalism,
baptismal records were looked at with great skepticism, so
many individuals of mixed grandparental heritage could not
prove their non-Jewish status by the mere production of a
baptismal certificate. A second example: the French extended
their inquiry into Jewishness to groups that the Germans had
29
long before decided not to touch, like the Mosaic Georgians

' The Mosaic Georgian sect, which honored and revered the Torah, were
suspect as a religious matter. By German approximation early in 1941, there were
some fifty Mosaic Georgians in France whose fate would have to be decided under
Vichy laws. The occupiers quickly made clear their own sense that these
individuals were not Jewish, both by the Nazis' race-oriented lights and by their
view of the sect's religious practices, too, which approximated Jewish practice only
in their reverence for the five books of Moses and in no other way. See WEISBERG,
VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE, ch. 6 (forthcoming 1996).
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and the Karaites. °
On the other hand, it has to be pointed out that there are
doctrinal areas in Vichy law which were often less persecutory
than the German equivalents. For example, landlord-tenant
law often went in favor of Jewish tenants who were seeking
rent reductions after their breadwinner lost his job or was
deported. Out-of-wedlock children of Jewish ancestry were
treated generously and the Sephardim in France, (who early in
the Vichy inquiry process were not necessarily considered
Jews), enjoyed a certain cushion of opportunity to escape (for a
while) the sanctions of the racial law. The indigenous legal
community continued to argue at length the matters that
counted to it, even where there was a firm German precedent
that might have controlled one way or another. So the French
often outdid the Germans at their own game or to put it better,
they insisted on playing their own Gallic version of the game.
One explanation for Vichy anti-Jewish legal developments
was ironically Vichy law's fierce anti-Germanism, a part of
France's overall xenophobia, particularly at periods of crisis.
Many of Vichy's fiercest anti-semites also detested the
Germans. One of these was the first Vichy justice minister,
Raphael Alibert. Men like Alibert wanted to carve out their
own path in the direction of racial prejudice. The Nazis were
largely willing to tolerate variations from their own racial
program. They were delighted to reduce their own manpower
needs by letting the French do it. And they quickly saw the
political benefit of transporting Vichy law into the occupied
zone as well, including of course Paris. Incidentally, French
racial law also travelled into the Channel Islands, whose
English-trained lawyers learned to split hairs with the best of
their French colleagues and to deport a handful of their own
meager Jewish population to the East.
Thus, the Vichy racial approach was progressively
integrated into the wartime law of western Europe. Prominent
Parisian lawyers advised clients on whether in fact they were
Jewish under the regime's definitions. They also counseled
"* The Karaites also believe in the Pentateuch and their name itself derives
from the Hebrew for "scriptures," but they reject the Talmud. There were Some
270 of them in wartime France. And the Nazis quickly took the same position
they had taken on the Mosaic Georgians. But in March 1942, Vichy officially took
the position that they were Jewish. See id.
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landlords who wondered how they could collect rent from
deported Jewish tenants. Or they assisted clients to aryanize
Jewish properties and "cleanse" major corporations (some of
which prominently still do business today) of their Jewish
shareholders and officers. Courts and bureaucrats argued right
up to the liberation of their towns and cities about whether
children of mixed marriages who were baptized could be
considered non-Jewish under the mounting legal precedents.
Law professors and manual writers numbering in the scores
entered the fray. Vichy racial law was big business. It was a
new area that, just as some might describe a new wine,
lawyers thought of as delicate and ripe with possibilities. What
legal community can resist, what even basically right-thinking
lawyer can resist these complex questions, particularly when
none but one has taken a stand in protest? Finally, all of this
occurred under the rubric of a constitutional scheme similar to
ours. The great pronouncements of the 1790s still lived in
Vichy. The Constitution of 1875 embodying them was never
repealed. In other areas Vichy law often intoned those great
maxims. Here, however, French lawyers never got themselves
together and never mobilized their community to argue the
obvious: the egalitarian models of French constitutional law
should not permit the weeding out of a group on the basis of
factors that are innate or implicate only the belief of the
individual. Question: Are we today weeding out individuals
and groups in our system, which is premised on the same
constitutional guidelines? Can we learn from Vichy-as our
negative model-to read our law and our quite similar
constitutional tradition better? Thank you.
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A REPORT ON THE LEGALITY OF EVIL:
THE CASE OF THE NAZI JUDGES
PROFESSOR DAVID LUBAN '

I have decided to title this talk on the Nazi judges "A
Report on the Legality of Evil." Obviously, I've modeled this
title on Hannah Arendt's famous and still controversial study
of Adolf Eichmann, which she called "A Report on the Banality
of Evil." 2 This notorious subtitle is usually misunderstood.
Arendt did not mean that evil, or Eichmann's evil, were banal.
Rather, she meant that Eichmann's motives were banal. She
meant that anyone who wants to understand how an ordinarily
ambitious and extraordinarily bland bureaucrat like Eichmann
could perform monstrous evil has to explain something
genuinely uncanny, what she once called "the grotesque
disparity between cause and effect."3 How is it, Arendt
asked, that "an average, 'normal' person, neither feeble-minded
nor indoctrinated nor cynical, could be perfectly incapable of
telling right from wrong"?'
I have borrowed Arendt's subtitle because I think that
parallel questions arise in connection with the German legal
profession, particularly the Nazi judges. The questions are
parallel, not identical. There is no reason to believe that the
Nazi judges shared Eichmann's moral psychology, the
blandness and thoughtlessness Arendt found in him. On the
contrary, the most notorious of these judges-Roland Freisler,
who presided over the trial of the July 20 Bomb
Plotters-seemed closer to the psychotic and obscene Julius
Streicher. Both were ranting, screaming Nazis from central
casting. Some judges, perhaps, shared the banality of evil, but
others surely did not.
On the other hand, the Nazi judges who participated
eagerly in the Third Reich's atrocities did share with

31 Morton and Sophia Macl t Professor Law, University of Maryland; Rezarch
Scholar, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. A talk prepared for the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York panel on the Nazi judges October
12, 1995.
2 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALTY oF
EVIL (rev. ed. 1963).
MHANNAH
24

ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM viii (rev. ed. 1970).

ARENDT, EIMciANN IN JERUSALEM, supra note 32, at 23.
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Eichmann one unnerving feature. There was something about
their position as mid-level officials in a bureaucratic hierarchy
that made them-in Arendt's phrase--"perfectly incapable of
telling right from wrong." What I want to ask tonight is
whether that something has to do with the law itself. Instead
of the banality of evil, therefore, my topic is the legality of evil.
In what way, and to what extent, does the rule of law
immunize and safeguard jurists from evil-doing-as we fondly
hope? In what way, to what extent, does the rule of law
instead immunize jurists from the still small voice of
conscience? That is the central jurisprudential question that
the case of the Nazi judges raises.
For jurists, one of the most troubling episodes of this
horrible era was the willingness or even eagerness of the
German legal profession and judiciary to advance the Nazi
program by enforcing monstrous law. Let me say what I mean
by the German judges being involved in enforcing monstrous
law. I am talking, for example, about the German laws against
sexual conduct or contact between Germans and Jews. I am
talking, therefore, about the case of Max Israel Adler, who is
jailed for looking across the street at Ilse S., a fifteen-year-old
pure-blooded German woman. 5 I am talking about Werner
Holldnder, who is killed for conducting an affair with a
German woman,3 6 and Leo Katzenberger, the head of the
Nuremberg Jewish community, executed for possibly having an
affair with a German woman." But not just these laws: I am
also talking about cases such as a Catholic youth group in the
early years of Nazism whose members are imprisoned for
engaging in sports activities and outings that hadn't been
approved by the Party, and therefore (according to the court
that sentenced them), giving aid and comfort to communism by
such public displays of lack of discipline.3 8
Shouldn't lawyers and judges be especially sensitive to the
juristic monstrosity of Nazi legislation? After all, instead of the
"rule of law, not of men," an ideal that dates back to Plato and
Aristotle, the fundamental principle of Nazi rule was the soINGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THRD REICH 111

(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans. 1991).
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 47-48.
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called "Leadership Principle," summarized in the slogan "The
Fifirer's words have the force of law."3 9 Don't jurists above all
others have a professional duty to maintain the rule of law?
The capitulation of the German profession, and especially the
German judges, led to a great deal of soul-searching by jurists
at a loss for an explanation. Were the German judges cowards,
or opportunists, or so fanatical that they were willing to
sacrifice their professional ideals for the Nazi cause? That was
the question.
Soon after the war, an unexpected and extremely
unpleasant answer was proposed-an answer profoundly
threatening to the legal profession's faith in the rule of law. It
came from Gustav Radbruch, one of the most eminent jurists
of the Weimar Republic. According to Radbruch, the problem
was not that German judges had abandoned the rule of law
but rather that they were enslaved by it. The real culprit,
Radbruch argued, was the legal philosophy of positivism-the
view that law and morality are separate, that a statute can be
legal even if it is wicked, and thus that the question "is it
legal?" is totally distinct from the question "is it moral?" Or, as
Radbruch put it, positivism made the German judges treat law
the way that German soldiers treated orders: Where the
soldier says, 'An order is an order,' the judges said, "'Alaw is
a law."'4 ° Because they were positivists, the German judges
thought it their duty to enforce even the most monstrous
decrees. In the words of Hans Kelsen, greatest of the German
positivists, "Even law that is bad in the opinion of the lawapplying organ has to be applied.... ."' In one notorious case,
a judge imposed the death sentence on a tradesman simply for
writing anti-Hitler graffiti on a men's room wall, in violation of
a wartime edict.4" The judges' capitulation to Nazism came
from excessive devotion to the rule of law rather than a too-

'Fahrerworte

40

haben Gesetzes Kraft was a common Nazi slogan.

Gustav Radbruch, Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy, in JOEL FEINBERG &

HYMAN GROSS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 109 (3rd ed. 1991).
41 HANS KELSEN, REITE
RECTrSLEHmE: EINLEITUNG

IN DIE RECHSWISSEN-

SCHAFIOCHE PROBLEMATIK 101 (1st ed. 1934) (stating -Auch dao -nach
des Rechtsanwenders-schlechte Gesetz ist anzuwenden. ... ).
4

Ansicht

This case is discussed in Gustav Radbhrch, Gecetliches Unrecht und

Obergesetziiches Recht, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 339 (Erik Wof & Hans Peter Schneider
eds., 8th ed. 1973).
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great readiness to abandon it. They loved the law not wisely
but too well. As German law professor Arthur Kaufmann reads
the case of the Nazi judges, "It appears, and this is fatal, that
a career in jurisprudence renders one incapable of recognizing
and opposing injustice."'
Part of the emotional power of Radbruch's explanation was
that it involved painful self-criticism, because Radbruch had
himself been one of the chief pre-war legal positivists. In one
anguished essay after another, Radbruch recanted his own
positivism for disarming the German judiciary in the face of
the Nazis. This may have been an unfortunate move by
Radbruch, because it provided a wonderful excuse for
compromised Nazi judges. Now they could deflect blame from
themselves to their positivist law teachers, who were by-andlarge liberals, or Social Democrats like Radbruch himself, or
Jews like Kelsen.44 (All of them, needless to say, lost their
jobs in 1933.) Judges who jumped on Radbruch's bandwagon
carefully ignored the fact that Kelsen wrote his positivist
masterpiece, The Pure Theory of Law, in 1934, explicitly with
the anti-Nazi agenda of insisting that judges should separate
law from politics.
As it happens, Radbruch's explanation became the
conventional wisdom among American jurists as well as
Germans. That is because Radbruch's diagnosis was repeated
and endorsed by America's most influential jurisprudential
46
thinker, Professor Lon Fuller of the Harvard Law School.
Fuller, who was a long-time critic of positivism, eagerly seized
on Radbruch's cri de coeur. But as a matter of fact, even
Fuller's chief philosophical adversary, the British positivist
Herbert Hart, conceded that the German judges had been
enforcing the positive laws of the Hitler regime.46 With the
two most eminent legal philosophers in the Anglo-American
world in agreement, positivist and anti-positivist alike, it is

"' Arthur Kaufinann, National Socialism and German Jurisprudence From 1933
to 1945, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1629, 1633 (1988).
MULLER, supra note 35, at 220-21.
• Lon L. Fuller, supra note 4, at 646-47.
4'H. L. A. Hart, supra note 4, at 615-21. Harts reply was that precisely if
you are a positivist, you should realize that a law can be valid but also too
wicked to obey. If the German judges refused to look past the question of legal
validity, that was not the fault of positivism.
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small wonder that Radbruch's thesis became the received
wisdom.
I said earlier that Radbruch's diagnosis of the German
judges is profoundly threatening to the legal profession's faith
in the rule of law. The reason is simple. To those of us reared
in the liberal-democratic legal tradition, the rule of law stands
as a mighty bulwark against tyranny, murder, and the
arbitrary decree. If it turns out that the rule of law can
actually grease the wheels of tyranny-if, as the eminent
contemporary positivist Joseph Raz has argued, the rule of law
is simply a tool, like a knife, that can be used for purposes
both good and evil 4 --then our trust in the bulwark gets
shaken.
Furthermore, the fact is that most American lawyers are
instinctive positivists. We are uncomfortable with natural law
ideas, which seem too redolent of religion and too much like
wishful thinking. Oliver Wendell Holmes enjoined us to bathe
our legal concepts in cynical acid in order to get the tincture of
moralism out of them, and by and large we have done what
Holmes asked. To be told by Radbruch that "[tihis view.., has
rendered the jurist as well as the people defenseless against
laws, however arbitrary, cruel, or criminal they may be!" is
to be told that our unofficial national philosophy of law may
make us patsies for fascism. This is not comforting news in the
era of Timothy McVeigh and Mark Fuhrman.
The question, then, is whether Radbruch was right. In
1987, a German jurist, Ingo Miller, published a best-selling
study of the Nazi judiciary. One of Miller's themes was that
the Nazi judges quite literally got away with murder in the
softness of postwar Germany. By publicizing this inconvenient
fact, and by naming names, Miller became the juridical
equivalent of the "Nasty Girl." Another theme, however, was
that Gustav Radbruch quite simply got things backward. The
real problem with the Nazi judges was not that they were
dyed-in-the-wool positivists, but that they weren't positivistic
enough.
The story Miller tells is simple. In 1871, Bismarck purged

4 Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93 LAw QUARTERLY REVIEW
195, 208 (1977).
"' RADBRUCH, supra note 40, at 109.
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liberals from the judiciary and replaced them with
ultraconservatives. The Weimar Republic made the fatal
mistake of leaving the Kaiser's judges in office, despite the fact
that these men hated the republic. Throughout the Weimar
period the judges brutally persecuted leftists and blatantly
protected the violent right, including Hitler. There was barely
a pretense of judicial impartiality, and in Brecht's witty slogan,
Germany changed from the land of Dichter und Denker-poets
and thinkers-to the land of Richter und Henker-judges and
hangmen.
When Hitler came to power, it was no shift at all for the
judiciary to become enthusiastically Nazified. Nor did the habit
of lawless partiality change: the Nazi judges politicized their
decisions shamelessly, as in the Reichstag fire trial, when the
supreme court refused even to consider evidence that the Nazis
had set the fire because-in the court's words--"The party's
ethical principles of restraint preclude the very possibility of
such crimes and actions...

."'

Nazi jurisprudence made a

point of rejecting legal positivism in favor of the so-called
"teleological method" of "creative" interpretation, according to
which judges must interpret a statute by determining its Nazi
ideological intent." In Miller's words, "National Socialist51
legal doctrines were the exact opposite of legal positivism"
and "the fairy tale of positivism whitewashed the entire
profession."52
Despite Miller's impressive documentation, I'm not so
sure he is right, however. Undoubtedly, the Nazi judges were
shockingly partial and political: their opinions are filled with
Nazi propaganda cloaked as fact. Thus, when the members of
the Catholic youth group were convicted of the "crime" of going
on outings and playing sports in violation of a Party decree,
the court explained that "Such a public display.., can all too
easily

become

an

encouragement

to

Communists. .

,3
...

Shocking dicta such as this, however, have nothing to do with
positivism or its opposite. In the German civil law system, we
must remember, judges are finders of fact as well as
'
6
61
62

Quoted in MULLER, supra note 35, at 33.
MULLER, supra note 35, at 80-81.

MULLER, supra note 35, at 220.
MULLER, supra note 35, at 222.

a MULLER, supra note 35, at 47-48.
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interpreters of law, and these parrotings of propaganda were
presented as factual determinations, not legal interpretations.
When we turn from fact-finding to law interpretation, it is
much less obvious that the Nazi judges weren't being good
positivists. The reason is quite simple: Nazi positive law
instructed judges to interpret statutes teleologically, not
positivistically. The clearest example is the notorious Article 2
of the Criminal Code (1935): "Punishment is to be inflicted on
persons who commit an act which has been declared
punishable by the Criminal Code, or which deserves to be
punished according to the spirit of a rule of criminal law and
healthy folk-feeling."
Plainly, Article 2 is an abomination. How should a judge
construe it? One way would be to reason that since it is a
criminal statute, Article 2 should be construed narrowly, and
in favor of the accused. But any such 'liberal" principle of
statutory construction would run contrary to the "Leadership
Principle." Thus, a positivist would have to agree that Article 2
instructs judges to determine whether "healthy folk-feeling"
would demand criminal punishment for an act-and the
phrase "healthy folk-feeling" was a standard euphemism for
whatever the Nazi Party wanted. Even if Nazi philosophy of
law denounced positivism, it is likely that ordinary judges were
doing exactly what positivism required of them.
This wouldn't be so if the kind of reasoning in Nazi
decisions was completely beyond the pale of recognizable
judicial rhetoric and reason. Unhappily, it isn't. The
condemnation of the Catholic youth group for going on
unauthorized outings and thereby aiding Communism is not
much different in tenor from American district court decisions
under the Espionage Act in World War I, where people were
convicted "for criticizing the Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A." or
"discourag[ing] women from knitting by the remark 'No soldier
ever sees these socks." 4 In one American case a woman was
convicted for saying, ' I am for the people and the government
is for the profiteers."5 In his instructions to the jury, the
judge denounced the Russian Revolution and used the
defendant's "declared sympathy with that Revolution, an

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 57 (1920).

6 Id. at 58.
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offense not punishable even under the Espionage Act, to show
how dangerous it was for her to talk about profiteers."56 A
closer parallel to the Nazi style of judging would be hard to
find.
Unfortunately, other examples come to mind. After the
Reichstag fire, Hitler declared a state of emergency that
suspended basic personal rights "to defend the state against
Communist acts of violence... ."' Miiller notes with outrage
that the Prussian Supreme Court "forbade lower courts to
determine whether the provisions of the decree were actually
met in specific instances."58 Yet judicial refusal to review
official decisions in military situations has been standard
American fare as well-most notably in the Korematsu decision
upholding the internment of Japanese Americans, 9 but more
recently in Goldman v. Weinberger,60 where the Supreme
Court declined to review an Air Force regulation forbidding an
orthodox Jew from wearing a yarmulke. Even the outrageously
savage sentences of the Third Reich have present-day
American parallels in Harmelin v. Michigan,61 where the
Supreme Court sustained a sentence of life without parole for
a first-offense drug possession, or Rummel v. Estelle,62 which
found the Court upholding a life sentence for $228 worth of
petty frauds.
I am obviously not arguing for the moral equivalence of
American and Nazi judges, and Americans recognize most of
the decisions I have just canvassed as infamously bad law. The
question isn't whether it is bad law, however. The question is
whether the reasoning of the Nazi judges is simply
unrecognizable by professional standards-and the answer is
that it is all too recognizable.
What misleads Miiller, I think, is that he identifies legal
positivism with a narrow, rule-oriented textualism.63
Positivism has no necessary connection with narrow

"Id.
'7 Quoted in MULLER, supra note 35, at 47.

MULLER, supra note 35, at 47.
9 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
60 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
01 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Here I am following Dubber, supra note 3, at 1820.
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textualism. Positivists insist that every legal system has a
"rule of recognition" specifying what counts as law and what
doesn't. If the rule of recognition instructs jurists to consult
"healthy folk-feeling" to determine the law, that doesn't make
it any the less a positivist rule of recognition than if it
instructs jurists to stick to the letter of the text, narrowly
construed." Miller doesn't recognize that in a legal system of
broad, explicitly politicized statutes coupled with equally
politicized canons of interpretation, positivism will invite
jurists to engage in role-identification with the regime's aims,
rather than rule-following.
The distinction between role-identification and rulefollowing is crucial. It takes us back to the question of how
mid-level officials in a bureaucratic hierarchy could be
perfectly incapable of telling right from wrong.
In 1971, shortly after the conviction of Lieutenant William
Calley for the My Lai massacres, social psychologists Herbert
C. Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton surveyed Americans' attitudes
toward crimes of obedience. Kelman and Hamilton asked
subjects whether they believed that most people would
massacre innocent civilians if they received Lieutenant Calley's
orders to shoot, and also whether the subjects would
themselves follow the orders. Far and away the largest group
(forty-seven percent) answered "yes" to both questions."
Virtually all of this group (ninety-four percent) also believed
that a Calley not only would but should follow orders to
shoot,66 and a large majority of them believe that neither
subordinates nor their superiors should be held responsible for
criminal actions that the superiors condoned but did not
explicitly order.' Two-thirds of this group believed it was
wrong to convict German officers at Nuremberg for war crimes
ordered by superiors.6" As the psychologists summarize their
findings, the large group of subjects who predict both that they

A

See Jules Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139

(1982).
C. KELwAN & V. LEE HAEMLTON, CRILES OF OBEDIENCE 173, Table
HERBERT
T
7.1 (1989) (453 out of 967 answered "yes" to both questions; the second most
common response, answering "no" to both questions, was given by 161 subjects).
Id. at 178, Table 7.2.

s Id. at 182, Table 7.3.
6 Id.
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would themselves follow orders to shoot civilians and that most
other people would do so "essentially rejected accountability in
the situation for all participants, not just for the
subordinates ......
Equally important for our purposes is Kelman and
Hamilton's finding that these compliant people fell into two
very different groups, the rule-oriented and the role-oriented.
Rule-oriented people follow rules to avoid trouble; they are
socialized into compliance, but they comply minimally and
passively; they think moral principles are irrelevant to rulegiving as well as rule-following; and they protest rules only if
their own security is threatened. By contrast, role-oriented
people believe that they have an obligation to obey and support
the government; they are socialized into identification, not
mere compliance; they take an active role in carrying out
policies; they believe that their moral obligation to government
overrides personal morality, and that government operates by
a special set of moral principles. They protest if their status,
rather than their security, is threatened."'
Both Radbruch's and Miller's versions of positivism
envision judges who are rule-oriented, but it seems clear from
these descriptions that the Nazi judges by and large were roleoriented, rather than rule-oriented. Role-orientation fits
seamlessly with "the odd notion, indeed very common in
Germany, that to be law-abiding means not merely to obey the
laws but to act as though one were the legislator of the laws
that one obeys." 2
And, as it happens, role-orientation-identifying with the
orderer rather than simply acquiescing in the orderscorresponds with the broader version of positivism that I have
been describing, a positivism that commands jurists to look
beyond the letter of a statute to its spirit. Yet both the ruleorientation and the role-orientation lead to the same result:
obedience at the expense of morality or even basic human
decency.
We must also not forget the differences between the
6

Id. at 185.

70

Id. at 269, Table 11.1.
Id.
ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANIsM, supra note 33, at 122.

71
7
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German civil law system and our own common law system.
These are not merely differences in procedure, or even
differences internal to the law. Legal systems reflect their
countries' larger systems of political authority, and Germany's
larger system has historically been bureaucratic and
hierarchical rather than decentralized.7 3 German judges are
neither political appointees nor elected officials: they are
Beamters, civil servants, who do not belong to the bar, who
begin their careers directly out of law school, and who are
gradually promoted as they gain experience and please their
superiors. As with other civil servants, bureaucratic
conscientiousness all too readily takes the place of bureaucratic
conscience.
I began with this question: does the rule of law immunize
and safeguard jurists from evil-doing or from the voice of
conscience? My answer, I fear, is "more the latter than the
former." And this for three reasons, only one of which is
specific to Germany. That is the point I just mentioned, that
German judges work in a hierarchical rather than a
decentralized system of authority. The other reasons, however,
are the psychology of role-identification, and the broad form of
legal positivism with which it corresponds entirely too well.
Positivists understand quite well that legal validity is no
talisman against evil; what they did not anticipate was how
little evil might trouble the conscience of a judge.
PROFESSOR RUTI G. TEITELO4
I would like to build on what's been said. We have been
looking largely at the role of judges during periods of
persecution, and I would like to continue the story as to
Germany by looking at three judges to see how post-Nazi
judges and post-communist judges have interpreted the
jurisprudence in the cases from the Nazi period. What do these
decisions tell us about how these judges confronted the

"' See generally MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986).

STATE

74 Professor of Law, New York Law School; Senior Schell Fellow, Yale Law
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dilemma? How do they resolve the question of the conflict
between evil laws and their role as judges? Are there any
lessons?
Let us begin with the most recent (post-communist)
decision, which begins at the Berlin Wall in 1989. Just before
reunification, East German border guards shot two East
Germans trying to escape across the border. These border
guards were prosecuted in 1991, and the question confronted
by the Berlin State Court was whether these defendants had a
defense in former East German (GDR) law.75 One might have
thought the Unification Treaty bound these judges, because, in
common with the rule of law in all democracies, the treaty
stated that the law that applied to these cases should be the
scene of the crime law.76 Thus, the question for the judges
was whether to apply GDR law and validate the defense that
they were just following the law prohibiting unlawful border
crossings.
The court posed the dilemma exactly as we are considering
it here, saying the question was whether the written (i.e.,
former) law was rightful, and that the issue seemed to be a
dilemma of law versus justice.77 What is interesting about
this decision is that it takes us back close to fifty years, to the
post-World War II German judiciary, because the court looks
back to other periods of persecution and post-persecution and
declares that it is guided by the post-war German judiciary
evaluating Nazi law, and so the cases that they look at are
(again) cases of collaborators.7 8 One in particular concerned a
woman who evidently had a bad marriage, and, using the Nazi
laws as an enabling opportunity for judicial murder, denounced
her husband, who was incarcerated. She was prosecuted after
the war for having done that. Now, her husband was arrested
but not killed, and in her defense she relied on Nazi law, and
said that this was the law she was following. 71 In confronting

" See Ruti G. Teitel, supra note 24; Kif A. Adams, What is just?: The Rule of
Law and Natural Law in the Trials of Former East German Border Guards, 29
STAN. J. INT'L L. 271 (1993).
7 Teitel, supra note 24, at 243.
7 Teitel, supra note 24, at 241.
78 Teitel, supra note 24, at 243. In rejecting the guards' defenses, it appears
that the court did not follow the treaty. Id.
7' See Note, German Citizen who Pursuant to Nazi Statute Infored on
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those laws in the 1950s, the German judiciary said that there
has to be a way of evaluating laws that are unjust; in "extreme
cases" there must be a possibility to weigh justice more highly
than legal certainty." So again, we see the dilemma between
formal law and justice; between the rule of law as security
versus what is just.
To return to the post-communist court: it held itself guided
by the postwar cases, and in a potentially controversial
analogy said both involve "extreme cases."3 ' Like the
collaborator cases, the border guard action was an "extreme
case," and in these "extreme cases," justice is more important
than certainty. 2 Now, it is worthy to note, that unlike the
other cases discussed on the panel that occurred during
persecution, here the act of validating the evil law would imply
an act of clemency, a defense: the border guards would go free.
This then is the reverse of those other cases, where validating
the law means a conviction. Coming up in the reverse, these
cases invert the usual case, but consider the same problem of
to what extent to validate evil laws.
Now, I would like to explore the reasoning of these two
courts: how they came to these decisions and to see what we
might draw from their reconciliation of the competing values
that we are considering here. The first effort at reconciliation
is the 1950 German judiciary's appeal to principles of natural
law. This was previously discussed by David Luban. This
appeal is illustrated by Gustav Radbruch's conversion. In his
movement from positivism to natural law, Radbruch declared
that law has to yield to justice. Following Radbruch, much of
the reasoning in these cases relies on natural justice
principles. In addition to this reasoning, in other reconciling
determinations these principles are codified in international
legal norms, adopting a concept which was very vivid at the
time in the 1950s. Certainly Nuremberg plays a role here,
along with the UN, the Geneva Convention, and the growth of
international law in general, with its proposition that
international law trumps national law, no matter how evil. So
Husband for Expressing Anti-Nazi Sentiments Convicted under Another German
Statute in Effect at Time of Act, 64 HARV. L. REV 1005 (1951).
" Teitel, supra note 24, at 243.
Si Teitel, supra note 24, at 243.
'2 Teitel, supra note 24, at 243.
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this already suggests an understanding that there is law and
there is law: there is more than one law.
Let me pursue this thread. The post-communist court,
considering the dilemma of the tension between morality
versus justice, doesn't leave it at that, but instead introduces a
very interesting way to think about the way judges might
confront this dilemma. The court suggested reasons why the
border guards should not have thought of the border protection
law as law, even though it was settled law. In particular, the
court discussed the lack of transparency: the fact of a news
blackout whenever there were shootings; soldiers were warned
not to speak; they were often transferred; the names were
erased from the records of whom might have been shot; when
foreign dignitaries came, there was an understanding that the
shootings had to stop. Lastly and most intriguingly the court
added to its decision a fact about one of the four defendants,
who had shot one of the people crossing the border. The
defendant had never worn his medal of merit for the shooting
in public because he knew that there was a strong likelihood of
insult and attacks, followed by recriminations by the GDR. The
point that the court draws from all of this is that we are all
aware of the difference between written law and law. Thus, the
court says "Justice and humanity were portrayed as ideals also
in the then GDR;"' and since these ideals as to justice were
known, many of the inhabitants of the GDR would have
considered these written laws unjust.
Here, there are several points. One is the idea of
transparency. Part of the rule of law is the idea that for a law
to be valid, it has to be written, it has to be published, and it
has to be applied generally.' Certainly that was understood.
But beyond that, the court points to the importance of public
opinion and perceptions of law and legal culture. The court
considers if there was a social consensus at the time and if
there was a breakdown in consensus on whether these laws
were just. The court suggests that the judges could draw upon
these considerations in their interpretation of these laws. The
court's reasoning is relevant because it suggests a way out of
the positivism-natural law dilemma as it is ordinarily framed

8' Teitel, supra note 24, at 241.
84 See also LON L. FULLER, THE MoRAirY OF THE LAW 39 (1964).
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because it suggests that the fact that the law is written is only
one element of what makes law positive, and that there are
others, such as a broader understanding of publication and
public perception.
I think this decision helps to explain how law is considered
in transitional periods, and relatedly, how we evaluate the
uses of law in periods of totalitarian rule. In a totalitarian
country, we might very well expect a gap between the law as it
is written and the people's understanding of the law. Indeed,
when we see the commencing of this divide, where contempt
for written law or for lawyers begins, it may signal the onset of
a new period. The danger sign is clear: lack of integration
between the public perception of law as lawful and the law as
written. That these attitudes are on the rise in our country is
rather troubling.
I want to conclude by suggesting that we can enrich our
debate about judgment on tyranny. The real question I suggest
is not the issue of the competing claims of morality versus the
duty to follow laws, nor the related question of the way we
frame and question these claims, but what law do judges
follow? What may well be most important about these
decisions is that they remind us of laws multiplicity. In
functioning democracies, as well as periods where totalitarian
countries are in transition towards more liberal regimes, there
begins to be a multiplicity of sources of the rule of law: natural
law as well as international law, societal consensus, and
constitutional law. These are all constraints on the judge's
interpretation of statutory law, the law of the sovereign, the
law we are considering here. I think this multiplicity helped to
advance the breakdown in the last wave of transitions: In a
period of technological change, we live more and more with
interconnected legal systems, and there is an inherent
multiplicity and coexistence of legal values and norms. This
interconnectedness helped usher in the collapse of repressive
regimes and the last wave of transition. Finally, recognizing
multiple sources of law allows us to see the importance of the
public sphere in shaping the understanding of the law, as well
as what law judges follow.
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JUDGE JACK B. WEINSTEIN'

I shall touch upon three points: first, a reminder of the
failures and successes of our American judiciary on human
rights; second, a discussion of options available to American
judges when faced with pressures to act immorally; and third,
predictions of American judges' future reactions.
German judges under the Nazis assisted in widespread
murder. They lacked the individual and institutional, and
perhaps jurisprudential, will to insist on justice. The reasons
have been suggested here orally, and in my extensive paper."6
American judges, by contrast, have a constitutional
obligation to protect life, liberty, due process and equality.
There is an individual direct responsibility from constitution to
judge-not one that runs through the state or the bureaucracy.
Each American judge is individually beholden to the people
and our conscience through the Constitution.
Our own legal system has sometimes failed to counter
challenges to what we now consider basic rights. I remind you
of the destruction of the Indians in colonial, revolutionary and
subsequent times; the Alien and Sedition Acts; Dred Scott and
other pro-slavery decisions; the sacrifice of former slaves'
freedoms to the political compromises toward the end of the
last century, culminating in Plessy; the frustration of
legislative attempts to protect workers and others against the
excesses of unconstrained capitalism; and the Japanese
internment camps.
Our understanding of the horrors of what happened in
Germany has critically affected post-World War II legal history
in this country. In the main, the tendency of our legal system,
particularly in the last fifty years, has been to protect the most
vulnerable. We have opened the courthouse doors to those
claiming abuse of their rights.
It would be both absurd and churlish in this great hall, in
this citadel of justice, not to acknowledge the contrast between
Nazi destruction of the rule of law aided by the connivance of
the German judiciary and our own veneration and real life

's Senior District Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New

York.
Unpublished manuscript, available on request from author.
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implementation of that rule. In these very environs Thurgood
Marshall mobilized the American bar for the legal struggle
that culminated in Brown. And in this building of the Bar
Association of the City of New York a critical fight to preserve
legal aid for the indigent is even now being mounted.
Of the various options available to American judges when
faced with an immoral law, only one is ruled out: silent
acquiescence. Federal senior judges, of which I am now one,
have the statutory option to refuse to take whole classes of
cases in which unjust results are preordained. 87 I submit that
every judge in this country, whether state or federal, has that
choice by virtue of his or her office because of the supremacy of
the federal Constitution which controls both state and federal
judges.
What would happen if all judges shared the same moral
revulsion to a particular law and refused to enforce it? There
would be a profound constitutional conflict and the nation
would have to look into its very soul. Morality and legal duty
would come into conflict. I believe morality would win.
Had the German judges, or any substantial portion of
them, resisted, they might have brought the Holocaust to a
halt before it started. But members of the German judiciary
did not think the Nuremburg laws unjust. Like many
Germans, some judges may have disagreed, but not on deeply
moral grounds.
Since the time of Bismarck, German judges were part of
what I consider a subservient state bureaucracy, appointed in
their youth. In sharp contrast, our judges are independent
personalities who take office only after they have demonstrated
their own strengths.
Resignation in the face of unjust laws is a principled
option for our judges, but it can also be seen as acquiescence
and defeat. I do not recommend it. In extreme cases, it will
result in replacement of good judges with government puppets,
eliminating the last vestiges of justice.
There are many techniques used by our courts to avoid
and circumvent dubious and immoral precedents. In criminal
cases, in which grave injustice is most likely to occur, the rule
of lenity as well as the specific and general guarantees of the
' See 28 U.S.C. § 294(b) (1984).
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Bill of Rights establish a duty in each individual judge to
follow the path that protects the accused against government
abuse.
Stare decisis is not a barrier to justice; the rules laid down
either by the highest court in the country or intermediate
courts are not immutable. Stare decisis does not apply when
constitutional or moral principals are challenged by its
application. The lower court is bound only where first, the rule
of the superior court is absolutely clear; second, changes in
caselaw, statutes or conditions make it certain that the rule
will remain unchanged in the higher court; and third, the rule
applies unequivocally to the facts before the court. My position
is, and I have discussed this point in my longer paper, that
even when all three conditions are satisfied, a previously
enunciated rule cannot, and should not, prevent an individual
American judge from following the Constitution and what he
or she considers its moral imperatives. Precedent can be
distinguished on many grounds, as, for example, by
characterizing the "rule" as dictum, and by finding parallel
lines of authority.
The district judge, particularly, has a closeness to, and in
general a superior appreciation of, the facts and thus a greater
ability to apply them to the law. Those insights cannot be
replicated at the appellate level.
Trial judges must be true to an inner core of responsibility.
They must sometimes risk, or even court, reversal to make
certain that the appellate courts, the bar, academia and the
public are fully aware that there is a strong opposing moral
view. Judges can ignore neither monstrous nor routine
injustices.
The sentencing guidelines are a prime paradigm of judicial
reaction to unjust laws. The federal guidelines relegate some of
the least culpable participants to being caged in prison for
excessive periods without the possibility of parole. Federal
guidelines have been recognized as a major injustice of our
time. Federal judges are almost unanimously opposed (I am
talking about trial judges, who I consider the reservoir of
morality in cases such as this) to mandatory minimums and to
overly harsh and rigid guidelines.
How have the judges reacted to the federal guidelines
which have proven so unjust in their application? First, many
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of them declared the guidelines unconstitutional. Then they
showed why the controlling statutory scheme under the
guidelines did not control in cases in which they produced
absurd and unjust results. When that tack failed, judges,
constrained to work within the guideline system, tried to
achieve maximum room to maneuver by expanding the power
to depart. At the same time they criticized the guidelines and
mandatory minimums in opinions, often following them with
expressed regret, while sending a strong public message of
protest. They made their objections known in a variety of other
ways from op-ed pages and law reviews to congressional
committee hearings. Finally, through such organizations as the
United States Judicial Conference and bar associations, they
urged legislative changes on the Congress and the Sentencing
Commission. The judges' struggle against immoral sentencing
laws has been effective to some extent because more and more
people now have a clearer notion of the injustices that are
taking place in our courts.
This awareness is beginning to have an ameliorating
impact on all three branches of government. Federal
intermediate appellate courts have reacted in a variety of
ways. Some have tried to restrict the trial judges in exercising
discretion. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized
that trial judges have a great deal of freedom and has
encouraged them to exercise judicial discretion, for example, to
protect families which would be devastated by excessive
sentences. Congress has acted explicitly to meet the demands
of the judges by producing a safety valve to avoid absurdly
long sentences. And the Attorney General of the United States
has responded through sound studies and talk, but little
action.
My own cohort of federal judges were steeled in the
depression; they understood what was going on in Germany
and Spain, and Italy and elsewhere in the thirties. We were
victorious in a terrible war against the legions of Hitler and
Hirohito. We were flushed in the post-war period with the
United States' post-war technological and economic success.
We were therefore not in a mood to knuckle under to what we
concluded were inhuman violations of due process to the
accused, and ethnic and racial injustices. That, I think,
explains in part what has happened in the last fifty years in
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the United States. Statutes, international treaties, and action
by private nongovernmental agencies on behalf of human
rights has also helped.
My cohort is rapidly moving offstage. There are current
attempts to gut protections to consumers, to the criminally
accused, to the elderly, to the poor, and to minorities of various
kinds. They will not pass unnoticed through the courts.
A serious question is what will be the reaction and the
theory and the role of the younger judges, lawyers and
academics who are now coming into power. My own
observation of the tough-minded, sensitive, superbly trained
and dedicated judges and magistrate judges in my own court in
the Eastern District of New York is that they can be depended
upon to do their duty to protect justice under the Constitution.
They will, I think, stand up for morality, for equality, and for
due process for all. Our thin judicial black line will, I believe,
hold against whatever assaults on justice we can foresee in the
United States.
Between the poles of acquiescence to injustice and
resignation from judicial office, many options are available to
American judges faced with the ostensible duty of enforcing
unjust laws. American judges can and must avail themselves
of those choices to defend morality. Injustices that pale in
comparison to the Holocaust are still sufficient cause for our
American judges to question and resist. When they
individually think it necessary, judges have responsibility to
speak up and act for justice.
PROFESSOR RICHARD H. WEISBERG
Judge Weinstein was typically concise and also I think
very inspiring in what he said. I would like to present a
slightly darker picture as a member of a generation that came
into intellectual and emotional fruition in the 1960s, a
headstrong generation. A generation that felt that it was not
necessarily bound or constrained by, for example, written laws,
and which then experienced the Vietnam War and a series of
assassinations, and (perhaps more to the point of this
conference) the influence of such schools of legal reasoning as
law and economics, legal pragmatism and other theoretical
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approaches that perhaps are deleterious, when it comes to our
subject tonight, to legal and judicial thinking. They run
counter to the vision that Judge Weinstein's generation
brought to law. And I am not at all optimistic that the
experiences of the Holocaust that we are all trying to
understand tonight are any longer alive to influence the
judiciary or other legal actors. Put it this way: what are the
lessons from the conduct of lawyers and judges under the laws
of the Third Reich or in Vichy? What kind of arguments in
opposition to unjust laws are we going to get from the current
generation of lawyers? Will our legal community, trained as it
currently is, take the courageous course or will they act like
French lawyers who made a big business out of the racial laws
and who learned to work with it at very low levels of
generalization? And I have seen their files, rve worked in the
archives, I've seen very distinguished lawyers incapable of
articulating the higher-level legal issues, much less moral
issues implicated. Or at least, I found them incapable of citing
them even in the context of in-house memoranda. How is our
current generation of advocates going to influence our current
generation of judges "to do the right thing?" I think that we
have an enormous amount of work, particularly as the memory
of the Holocaust begins to be threatened not only by those who
deny the Holocaust but just by the passage of time and the
onslaught of pragmatism.

PROFESSOR FRITZ STERN
I found Judge Weinsteins remarks enormously inspiring
and encouraging. I think one has to remember that for all the
necessity to draw on lessons in the past-and I will come to
that later-it is also terribly important not to make easy
analogies and not to forget the immense differences between
the United States and the traditions of this country and the
history of Germany or for that matter France. The difference
between Germany and France is also very, very great but what
was done in Vichy, if I might just put this very quickly, was
really a French anti-revolution: the part of France that never
accepted 1789 was waiting for defeat at the hands of the
Germans to bring about a counter-revolution, so to speak. I
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think that this country, blessed by its Constitution and by the
basic commitment to it, is therefore very, very different from
the German theme. All of you know this probably much better
than I do, so it's not for me to say too much about the relation
of the judiciary to the political culture or to public opinion. But
I would particularly like to turn to one thing in Professor
Luban's remarks and simply supplement it, if I may: Yes,
there are obviously examples in the American past of judges
making immoral or amoral decisions; but the huge difference
(it is almost unnecessary to say this, but we mustn't forget it)
is that in this country liberal principles are still enshrined.
They are enshrined in the Constitution and in a free press,
which ought not to be underestimated, which does not exist in
a totalitarian state. Therefore, frankly, if one wants to draw
lessons from the German situation, one should be aware of
attacks on liberal principles because those are the ones that
are protecting us and have protected us. The Germans have
had a long tradition of anti-liberalism on the left as well as on
the right most especially. It would be unfortunate if we forgot
how important the promotion of a political culture is;
fortunately the formation of our political culture still enshrines
the liberal principle.
PROFESSOR RUTI G. TEITEL

I wish to comment and pose a question, building on what
Professor Stern suggested. Is the notion of Auschwitz as a
'lesson" troubling? To what extent is Auschwitz a "lesson"maker? To me, Auschwitz seems like an "extreme" case in the
sense that the Berlin court spoke of "extreme cases." Would we
equate the border guard with a Nazi collaborator? In a period
of debate on "cultural relativism," what are extreme cases?
This question-what are the extreme cases?-is one that more
and more, judges and citizens and lawyers confront. I think
there is a breakdown in that understanding.

1995]

SYMfPOSIM

1161

PROFESSOR RICHARD H. WEISBERG

I think that we are learning more and more every day
about the Vichy period, which was shrouded for fifty years in
the myth of universal resistance and which the French only
recently have begun to fess up to. We learn that Vichy is not
an extreme case, but again a case closer to that of our own
experience and therefore more threatening and important to
learn about. The second Vichy justice minister, Joseph
Barthelemy, was a professor of constitutional law who prior to
the war-unlike his extremist predecessor Alibert-enjoyed a
reputation not dissimilar to that of George Ball or Floyd
Abrams. Yet he became a prominent member of the Vichy
government promulgating the second Vichy racial statute of
June 2, 1941, signing into law the special session courts that
summarily tried and executed individual French defendants
who were suspected of Gaullism or communism, and
accomplishing a number of other complex and more obvious
excesses during his stay in government. How do individuals
like that become co-opted? This is, I think, a cautionary tale
for us, and not an extreme case except that it provokes us to
wonder how a lawyer with those beliefs (an outspoken antiNazi in the 1930s, a defender of individual rights throughout
his life and in all of his writings) becomes during a period of
crisis something very different from what he has always been.
There were many such people in the government who were not
vicious anti-Semites and who were fully in favor of traditional
French egalitarian rights who changed, who were able to
change. His case suggests that there is something about legal
professionalism that we need to explore.

PROFESSOR DAVID LUBAN

I have a few stories that I think are cautionary stories.
First of all, I think I am less sanguine than Judge Weinstein
about what would have happened if all of the German judges
had refused to enforce monstrous Nazi law, and resigned. They
would have been replaced by Nazis, and if judges kept on
refusing to enforce the law the Party would have done what it
was doing anyway, which was simply shooting people regard-
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less of the law. I think that that is a problem. First is a story
which is meant to illustrate that a problem of conscience is
recognizing when the crisis is on you. At the point at which
Jews were being expelled from the profession, the Deutscher
Anwaltverein, which is the German equivalent of the ABA,
voted to expel all of its Jewish members. Now it happened that
there was a majority of Jews on the governing committee of
the Deutscher Anwaltverein; they all abstained from this vote
because of their clear conflict of interest. They didn't realize
that something extraordinary, not something ordinary, had
come on them. And I think that part of the problem of saying
what we have to do is to fight immorality is that it is very
hard to recognize when the crisis is on us. Second is a story
that I heard recently from a colleague. I haven't been able to
verify it yet. It is about the practicing bar. So far we have been
talking about judges, this story is about I.G. Farben Chemical
Company, which ran its own concentration camp with slave
labor. It signed contracts with the Nazi government saying
that they would feed and house the slave labor. When the
policy of the government changed to allowing the slave
laborers to work themselves to death, the legal department of
I.G. Farben was instructed, so the story goes, and carried out
the instruction to try to break the contract and save the
company money on food because after all, why should the
company lose good money on people who were about to be
killed anyway? From this the message that I would like to
draw is that it is a mistake to focus simply on judges. It is the
role of practicing lawyers that is extraordinarily important in
the resistance to immorality. Third, I am worried about the
possibility of appellate judges who reverse the good work of
trial judges. Almost all of the cases that I was describing
earlier were appellate reversals of trial judges who had
acquitted. And in 1944, Otto von Thierack, who was then the
Minister of Justice in Germany, began sending around letters
to the German judiciary saying, "Of course I do not want to tell
independent judges how to decide cases, but I do think that it
is important to criticize some plainly erroneous decisions. For
example, here we have a judge who has a piece of litigation
over coffee rations between a Jew and a German, and who
sides with the Jew. What kind of message is that sending?"
Although it seems to be reading between the lines of
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Thierack's letters, it must be that there were some courageous
trial judges in German as late as 1944. The problem was that
the trial judges were not the judges of the last instance.
Now for the last story. I think that it is no secret that I
think the disease of overpunishment is creeping up on
America. I came across the Nazi three strikes and you are out
statute, the statute on habitual offenders. Of course, ours is
three strikes and you are in jail for life. Ingo Miller is
outraged at the Nazi statute three strikes and you get fifteen
years maximum!
PROFESSOR FRTz STERN
I will try to be very, very brief. I agree with Professor
Luban that the important thing is to recognize the crisis and
the challenge when it comes. But I want to register two
dissents. First, I want to clarify the story which involved the
society of lawyers and Jews voting and not voting. There was a
committee meeting, the presidium of that society met, and it
decided not to expel the Jews. This decision was later reversed.
Although they changed their minds later, I think there has to
be a certain amount of historical respect for this minor gesture
of German lawyers, in that particular committee, refusing to
expel the Jews. Thus it is perfectly true that Jews did not
vote-but not on that occasion. Secondly, I powerfully disagree
with the notion that if all German judges had collectively
resigned it would have made no difference. It would have made
a huge difference, and we probably would not even have had a
Second World War.
PROFESSOR RICHARD H. WEISBERG

And that goes doubly for France. As I suggested, and we
even have examples from elsewhere in Europe of organized
protest at high levels having important results on the
elaboration of systems that had identical statutory structures,
it isn't the black ink of the statute that determines how a legal
system runs. It is the way that the legal community
understands and implements, or refuses to implement, the
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dictates of the dead page that they see in front of them. You
have to give life to anything to make it forceful within a
community. It's perhaps the desire for legal professionalism
more than anything else that motivates us, and which we need
to be aware of. It motivates us to accept somewhat
unquestioningly what we view to be the severe constraints or
dictates of statutes or laws that we abhor. The Vichy example
urges us to grasp, in the situation, the full legal and moral
implication of what we are doing, and not to nitpick. But it is
very difficult, in the heat of practice, to understand what the
larger issues are, and I think we have to be alert and always
able to step at least a half step back from where we are to try
to figure out what we are doing. Is this really part of what we
were trained to do? Is this consonant with our understanding
of the ideals and the constitutional laws of this country? Am I
a cog in the wheel or am I someone who can be reflective as a
professional and either make some changes or fight to preserve
what is best in the system when others have been pushed to
change it?

